Chapter 1: The Context of the Treaty

On the anniversary of his ill-fated invasion of Ukraine, Putin delivered a speech that alarmed leaders worldwide. As reported by The Guardian, Putin declared, “They wish to impose a strategic defeat upon us and seize control of our nuclear facilities. Therefore, I must announce that Russia is halting its involvement in the strategic offensive arms treaty.” With this announcement, Russia has effectively abandoned a crucial nuclear arms agreement that has maintained stability in international nuclear relations for over a decade. This raises important questions: What does this signify for Ukraine? What does it imply for the West? And perhaps most critically, what does it mean for Russia itself?

First, it’s essential to understand the original intent of this nuclear treaty. In 2010, then-President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed the New START treaty. This agreement established limits on the number of strategic nuclear warheads that both the United States and Russia could deploy. Specifically, the treaty capped the number of deployable warheads at 1,550, alongside a maximum of 700 long-range missiles and bombers. To ensure compliance, each nation was permitted to conduct up to 18 inspections of each other’s nuclear sites annually.

Recently, Russia has circumvented the treaty by denying site inspections and only providing limited information about its nuclear stockpile. However, now that Putin has officially withdrawn from the treaty, Russia is free to increase its nuclear arsenal, potentially escalating global nuclear threat levels to those reminiscent of the Cold War.

But can we expect Putin to pursue this course?

The Kremlin has stated that despite their withdrawal, they intend to adhere to clauses that ensure a level of predictability and stability in the nuclear missile domain. This is a logical approach. The United States, Russia’s primary nuclear rival, possesses extensive intelligence capabilities, enabling them to monitor potential stockpiling of nuclear arms in Russia. While they may not know specific details, they would be sufficiently informed to adjust their own arsenal in response. Moreover, Putin is acutely aware that any escalation into a nuclear conflict would likely lead to Russia’s complete devastation.

However, there are likely additional factors restraining Putin from amassing a new nuclear arsenal. Notably, while President Biden was in Kyiv, Russia conducted a test of its latest intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), known as Satan II, purportedly to showcase its threat capabilities. Unfortunately for Russia, the test was a complete failure. Viewing the U.S. and NATO as their primary nuclear adversaries, they would be inclined to bolster their long-range missile capabilities, but this is contingent on the successful operation of their latest models.

So, if Putin’s intention isn’t to enhance Russia’s nuclear intimidation, what might his strategy be?

According to John Erath, Senior Policy Director at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, this move may be “entirely symbolic.” Withdrawing from a treaty designed to prevent nuclear catastrophe sends a clear, intimidating message regarding Russia’s perspective on Western support for Ukraine.

However, my perspective diverges from Mr. Erath’s. I perceive a tactical rationale behind Putin’s decision to abandon the treaty.

International concern primarily revolves around ICBMs armed with hydrogen bombs, which possess significantly greater yields than traditional fission bombs. For instance, the U.S. B83 hydrogen bomb can yield up to 1.2 megatonnes, whereas the bomb dropped on Hiroshima, Little Boy, had a yield of only 15 kilotonnes—150 times less powerful.

In a nuclear engagement, the goal is to ensure maximum destruction. Once a nuclear missile is launched, it initiates a catastrophic chain reaction, compelling adversaries to respond with their own nuclear capabilities unless neutralized. Thus, for any credible nuclear threat, particularly toward the U.S. and NATO, a significant stockpile of hydrogen bomb-equipped ICBMs is essential. Absent this, adversaries may doubt their willingness to employ these weapons, given that they themselves could face overwhelming retaliation.

This is why North Korea’s nuclear ambitions elicit only moderate concern from the international community rather than immediate alarm.

The challenge lies in the fact that hydrogen bombs rely on specific isotopes of hydrogen—tritium and deuterium—to achieve their explosive potential. Tritium is particularly problematic; it has a half-life of just 12.5 years, necessitating regular replenishment in nuclear reactors, making its production costly—around $30,000 per gram.

Currently, Russia faces significant financial strain due to its prolonged military engagement. The Kremlin has already expended upwards of a hundred billion U.S. dollars, and expenses continue to mount. Western sanctions are crippling Russia’s oil industry, its primary revenue source, potentially jeopardizing its ability to maintain its hydrogen bombs. In fact, it’s plausible that Russia’s hydrogen bombs may already be deficient in tritium, rendering their nuclear threats more bluster than substance.

In Putin’s position, one might consider concealing the true status of nuclear facilities to maintain an illusion of operational hydrogen bombs, thereby avoiding the costs of refueling while preserving a semblance of nuclear deterrence. Ultimately, the power of a nuclear weapon lies not solely in its destructive capability but in its political leverage across borders.

By withdrawing from the New START treaty, Putin has executed this strategy perfectly. It exemplifies his typical approach—exuding bravado and intimidation while lacking substance. Observing how well Ukraine has resisted the Kremlin’s advances, one might question the perception of Russia’s military prowess. Before the invasion, many believed Russia possessed a formidable military capability that could threaten NATO, yet untrained but resolute Ukrainian forces have successfully held them at bay for over a year. Thus, the West should not be overly concerned about Putin’s departure from this nuclear treaty; if anything, it underscores Russia’s inherent weakness.

This video discusses the implications of Putin's statement regarding NATO's nuclear capabilities in light of his withdrawal from the arms treaty.

This video covers Putin's exit from the last remaining nuclear arms treaty with the United States, emphasizing the potential consequences for global security.